Thomas Aquinas
Summa Contra Gentiles
Book 3
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3a.htm#37
chapter 37
[1] So, if the ultimate felicity of man does not consist in
external things which are called the goods of fortune, nor in the goods
of the body, nor in the goods of the soul according to its sensitive
part, nor as regards the intellective part according to the activity of
the moral virtues, nor according to the intellectual virtues that are
concerned with action, that is, art and prudence—we are left with the
conclusion that the ultimate felicity of man lies in the contemplation
of truth.
[8] However, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity
to consist in the contemplation which depends on the understanding of
principles, for that is very imperfect, being most universal, including
the potential cognition of things. Also, it is the beginning, not the
end, of human enquiry, coming to us from nature and not because of our
search for truth. Nor, indeed, does it lie in the area of the sciences
which deal with lower things, because felicity should lie in the working
of the intellect in relation to the noblest objects of understanding.
So, the conclusion remains that man’s ultimate felicity consists in the
contemplation of wisdom, based on the considering of divine matters.
[9] From this, that is also clear by way of induction,
which was proved above by rational arguments, namely, that man’s
ultimate felicity consists only in the contemplation of God.
chapter 38
[1] It remains to investigate the kind of knowledge in
which the ultimate felicity of an intellectual substance consists. For
there is a common and confused knowledge of God which is found in
practically all men; this is due either to the fact that it is
self-evident that God exists, just as other principles of demonstration
are—a view held by some people, as we said in Book One [25]—or, what
seems indeed to be true, that man can immediately reach some sort of
knowledge of God by natural reason. For, when men see that things in
nature run according to a definite order, and that ordering does not
occur without an orderer, they perceive in most cases that there is some
orderer of the things that we sec. But who or what kind of being, or
whether there is but one orderer of nature, is not yet grasped
immediately in this general consideration, just as, when we see that a
man is moved and performs other works, we perceive that there is present
in him some cause of these operations which is not present in other
things, and we call this cause the soul; yet we do not know at that
point what the soul is, whether it is a body, or how it produces these
operations which have been mentioned.
[3] In fact, the operation of the man enjoying felicity
must be without defect. But this knowledge admits of a mixture of many
errors. Some people have believed that there is no other orderer of
worldly things than the celestial bodies, and so they said that the
celestial bodies are gods. Other people pushed it farther, to the very
elements and the things generated from them, thinking that motion and
the natural functions which these elements have are not present in them
as the effect of some other orderer, but that other things are ordered
by them. Still other people, believing that human acts are not subject
to any ordering, other than human, have said that men who order others
are gods. And so, this knowledge of God is not enough for felicity.
[4] Again, felicity is the end of human acts. But human
acts are not ordered to the aforementioned knowledge, as to an end.
Rather, it is found in all men, almost at once, from their beginning.
So, felicity does not consist in this knowledge of God.
[5] Besides, no man seems to be blameworthy because of the
fact that he lacks felicity; in point of fact, those who lack it, but
are tending toward it, are given praise. But the fact that a person
lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God makes him appear very blameworthy.
Indeed, a man’s dullness is chiefly indicated by this: he fails to
perceive such evident signs of God, just as a person is judged to be
dull who, while observing a man, does not grasp the fact that he has a
soul. That is why it is said in the Psalms ( 13:1, 52:1): “The fool hath
said in his heart: There is no God.” So, this is not the knowledge of
God which suffices for felicity.
chapter 47
[9] Although this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects
the likeness of God in a closer way than lower creatures do, the
knowledge of God which can be taken in by the human mind does not go
beyond the type of knowledge that is derived from sensible things, since
even the soul itself knows what it is itself as a result of
understanding the natures of sensible things, as we have said. Hence,
throughout this life God can be known in no higher way than that whereby
a cause is known through its effect.
chapter 48
[1] If, then, ultimate human felicity does not consist in
the knowledge of God, whereby He is known in general by all, or most,
men, by a sort of confused appraisal, and again, if it does not consist
in the knowledge of God which is known by way of demonstration in the
speculative sciences, nor in the cognition of God whereby He is known
through faith, as has been shown in the foregoing; and if it is not
possible in this life to reach a higher knowledge of God so as to know
Him through His essence, or even in such a way that, when the other
separate substances are known, God might be known through the knowledge
of them, as if from a closer vantage point, as we showed; and if it is
necessary to identify ultimate felicity with some sort of knowledge of
God, as we proved above; then it is not possible for man’s ultimate
felicity to come in this life.
[16] And so, man’s ultimate felicity will lie in the
knowledge of God that the human mind has after this life, according to
the way in which separate substances know Him. For which reason our Lord
promises us “a reward in heaven” and says that the saints “shall be as
the angels... who always see God in heaven,” as it is said (Matt 5:12;
22:30; 18:10).
chapter 51
[5] This immediate vision of God is promised us in
Scripture: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
to face” (1 Cor. 13:12). It is wrong to understand this in a corporeal
way, picturing in our imagination a bodily face of the Divinity, since
we have shown that God is incorporeal. Nor is it even possible for us to
see God with our bodily face, for the power of corporeal vision, which
is associated with our face, can only apply to corporeal things. Thus,
then, shall we see God face to face, in the sense that we shall see Him
without a medium, as is true when we see a man face to face.
Study Questions:
1. What are the different ways of knowing God? Why are some of these mixed with error? If the error was removed are these properly the highest knowledge of God or is this only achieved through contemplation in the next life?
2. What is the highest good? What is felicity and how is it attained? Why must it be connected to knowledge of what is lasting?
3. Aquinas quotes Jesus as saying that there is a treasure in heaven, and Paul as saying we will see face to face. In their context, what else might these be about rather than the beatific vision?
4. Contrast the direct vision of God (which is called contemplation or immediate knowledge) with the knowledge of God through the works of God (creation and providence, mediate knowledge).
5. In what way is Aquinas an empiricist? In what way does he continue the assumptions of Greek dualism?
